Pod nosem Europy umacniają potężny sojusz. Połączenie sił ich armii grozi armagedonem
Niedawny szczyt grupy BRICS w Kazaniu potwierdził raz jeszcze wysiłki Rosji wobec włączenia krajów globalnego Południa do zmiany porządku gospodarczego świata i przeciwstawienia się Stanom Zjednoczonym oraz Zachodowi. Jest się czego bać?
•
16. szczyt BRICS, który pod koniec października odbył się w Kazaniu, uznano za wizerunkowy, dyplomatyczny i propagandowy sukces Kremla.
• Rosja pokazała, że może i potrafi przeciwstawić się zachodnim wysiłkom jej izolacji na arenie międzynarodowej.
• Szczyt potwierdził nieustające wysiłki Rosji oraz Chin do wciągnięcia krajów globalnego Południa w przebudowę ładu światowego. Ma być wielobiegunowość. Co to znaczy?
Szczyt BRICS w Kazaniu odbywał się pod hasłem: "Wzmacnianie wielostronności dla sprawiedliwego globalnego rozwoju i bezpieczeństwa". Analitycy nie mają wątpliwości, że miał on przede wszystkim służyć Rosji oraz Chinom do wciągnięcia krajów globalnego Południa w przebudowę obecnego ładu światowego. Miałby być oparty o wielobiegunowość.
Czyli doprowadzić do zmian porządku struktury gospodarczej świata, w którym rolę pierwszoplanową odgrywałaby Rosja i przeciwstawienia się Stanom Zjednoczonym oraz ich zachodnim sojusznikom.
Od czasu agresji Rosji na Ukrainę świat stał się niebezpieczny. Wszystkie spotkania przeciwników, które maja pomóc z zmianie już przecież zachwianego systemu światowego bezpieczeństwa, obserwowane są z uwagą. Podobnie było ze szczytem w Kazaniu.
Wraz z początkiem nowego roku do BRICS, którą współtworzyły Brazylia, Rosja, Indie, Chiny oraz Republika Południowej Afryki, w której przewodnictwo sprawuje Rosja w 2024 r., dołaczyły nowe kraje. To
Egipt, Etiopia, Iran i Zjednoczone Emiraty Arabskie
. Arabia Saudyjska wciąż nie podpisała dokumentu akcesyjnego, a Argentyna wycofała się ze swojej aplikacji.
Kilka krajów uzyskało status kraju partnerskiego, wymyślonego w Kazaniu po to, by rozszerzyć BRICS o państwa, które z różnych powodów nie spełniają wcześniej określonych kryteriów.
Według rosyjskiego prezydenta Władimira Putina w kolejce do organizacji czeka ok. 30 państw. W tym celu
Rosja próbuje przeciągnąć na swoją stronę kolejne kraje rozwijające się, przede wszystkim z Afryki.
Przykładem jest
Nigeria
, która jako ostatnia uzyskała status kraju partnerskiego. To najludniejszy, liczący ok. 200 mln mieszkańców kraj na kontynencie. Ponad 87 mln ludzi żyje tam poniżej granicy ubóstwa. Średnie miesięczne zarobki to niecałe 20 dolarów, a inflacja przekracza 30 proc. Kraj ma bogate zasoby ropy naftowej i gazu, ale lata zaniedbań sprawiły, że musi importować benzynę i produkty ropopochodne.
Państwami partnerskimi zostały też
Algieria
, największe powierzchniowo państwo w Afryce, bogate w zasoby mineralne i energetyczne, które nie ma długu zewnętrznego i pozostanie członkiem Nowego Banku Rozwoju BRICS, do którego wniosło 1,5 mld dol., oraz
Uganda
, która jest jednym z najbiedniejszych państw świata. Zmaga się z brakiem infrastruktury gospodarczej, analfabetyzmem i chorobami.
Pomysł nowej waluty wirtualnej, którą chciała wprowadzić Rosja, spalił na panewce
Członkiem grupy została Etiopia, w której na 126 mln ludzi ok. 30 mln żyje w skrajnym ubóstwie. Dla krajów afrykańskich BRICS nie jest zatem alternatywą wobec Zachodu, jak chciałaby tego Rosja, ale jak podkreślają analitycy dodatkowym potencjalnym źródłem pozyskiwania pieniędzy i inwestycji. Przy okazji daje możliwość poczucia, że gra się w ważnej lidze światowej gospodarki.
Niemniej kraje BRICS stanowią ok. 42 proc. światowej populacji, 30 proc. światowej powierzchni lądu i 24 proc. globalnej produkcji gospodarczej.
W ich rękach jest też 45 proc. rezerw ropy naftowej
. Gdyby połączyły się gospodarczo, byłyby silną alternatywą dla Unii Europejskiej oraz USA.
Na razie to sfera deklaracji. Pomysł nowej waluty wirtualnej, którą chciała wprowadzić Rosja, spalił na panewce, a przynajmniej żadnych konkretnych decyzji co do rozwoju alternatywnego systemu płatności w handlu międzynarodowym nie podjęto.
Do detronizacji dolara nadal daleko
. Do tego zdolność krajów BRICS do odgrywania roli przeciwwagi dla świata zachodniego w myśl rosyjsko-chińskiej koncepcji są ograniczone. Dzielą je interesy, niektóre są nawet skłócone.
Przykładowo
Chiny i Indie
utrzymują różne roszczenia terytorialne do obszaru Aksai w Chinach, który jest spornym terytorium od kilku dziesięcioleci. Dopiero niedawno podpisano porozumienie mające zaprowadzić spokój na granicy chińsko-indyjskiej w Himalajach, które przynajmniej na razie zakończyło trwający od czterech lat spór graniczny.
Nie wydaje się też, żeby w najbliższej przyszłości doszło do wojskowej współpracy państw BRICS
, choć były urzędnik Departamentu Stanu USA David Tafuri ostrzega, że
Iran, Syria i Chiny mogą wysłać swoich żołnierzy do Rosji
, prawdopodobieństwo przystąpienia przez nie do jakiegoś konfliktu, jest niewielkie.
Przykładem Iran, który do wojny z Izraelem, ani żadnej innej, poważnie się nie przygotowuje i nie ma jej w planach. Jego wysiłek militarny jest na niewielkim poziomie, wynoszącym 2,3 proc. PKB. Według specjalistów, chociaż wygląda to dość absurdalnie, wygląda na to, że
kraje BRICS, jeśli się zbroją, to... głównie przeciwko sobie nawzajem.
Decydującą rolę w BRICS ze względu na potencjał militarny odgrywają Rosja, Indie i Chiny
Decydującą rolę w BRICS, przede wszystkim ze względu na potencjał militarny, dzięki któremu zdolne są wspólnie stawić czoła globalnej potędze USA, odgrywają 3 mocarstwa światowe:
Rosja, Indie i Chiny
. To też okazja, by przypomnieć, jakim potencjałem bojowym dysponują najważniejsze kraje, założyciele BRICS.
Ranking nie sposób rozpocząć inaczej, jak od Chin.
Chińska Armia Ludowo-Wyzwoleńcza to największe liczebnie siły zbrojne na świecie
. Chińczycy mają pod bronią 2,25 mln żołnierzy (ok. 0,18 proc. populacji ChRL), a łącznie z formacjami paramilitarnymi - 3,25 mln. W razie zagrożenia są też w stanie zmobilizować ponad 7 mln ludzi. Dysponują aż 216 mln rezerwistów.
Od pięciu lat rosną też chińskie wydatki na armię.
W przyszłym roku fundusze przeznaczane na zbrojenie mają być większe o 7,2 proc. i wyniosą 231 mld dol. Według danych Polskiego Instytutu Spraw Międzynarodowych (PISM) armia chińska składa się z 13 grup armijnych.
Marynarka wojenna liczy ponad 370 okrętów, siły powietrzne ok. 2400 samolotów bojowych, a strategiczne siły rakietowe ok. 350 międzykontynentalnych rakiet balistycznych. Do tego dochodzą strategiczne siły wsparcia, odpowiadające za działania w kosmosie, cyberprzestrzeni, walkę elektroniczną, informacyjną, telekomunikacyjną i psychologiczną. No i oczywiście broń atomowa. Ocenia się, że
Chińczycy dysponują ok. 500 głowicami jądrowymi.
Budżet obronny Chin jest jednak wciąż ponad trzy razy mniejszy niż wydatki militarne Stanów Zjednoczonych. Pod koniec ubiegłego roku prezydent USA Joe Biden podpisał roczną ustawę o obronności o wartości 886 mld dol.
Równie liczna jest armia indyjska. Pod bronią jest tam ponad 1,3 mln żołnierzy.
To trzecie siły zbrojne na świecie pod względem liczebności (po ChRL i USA).
Z rocznym budżetem na cele obronne w wysokości 73,6 mld dol.
Co ważne,
wojsko jest w pełni zawodowe
. Ich arsenał obejmuje m.in. broń jądrową (172 głowice), 3500 czołgów, 1250 samolotów, 600 śmigłowców i 170 okrętów. Na obronność wydają ok. 2 proc. swojego PKB.
Dla nas najważniejsze są siły zbrojne Federacji Rosyjskiej
Według PISM, mimo strat ponoszonych w wojnie z Ukrainą,
Rosja konsekwentnie realizuje plany zwiększania potencjału swoich sił zbrojnych
i rozpoczyna szeroko zakrojone zmiany w ich strukturach.
Zakładają one m.in. zwiększenie stanu osobowego armii do 1,5 mln osób. Tworzone są nowe dywizje i inne jednostki. Już sformowano 2 armie ogólnowojskowe, 1 korpus lotnictwa oraz 50 innych jednostek wojskowych różnego szczebla, w tym 4 dywizje, 18 brygad i 28 pułków.
W 2023 r. do sił zbrojnych tego państwa wstąpiło 490 tys. osób, z czego ponad połowę (ok. 277 tys.) stanowili poborowi. Jedną z zachęt były kwestie finansowe. Minimalna kwota żołdu żołnierzy w 2023 r. wynosiła 210 tys. rubli (ok. 2,3 tys. dol.).
Wydatki zbrojeniowe Rosji wzrosły w 2023 r. o 36 proc. w porównaniu z 2022 r., co stanowiło ok. 5 proc. PKB (w 2021 r. było to 4 proc. PKB). W latach 2024-2025 Rosja planuje przeznaczyć na ten cel aż 6 proc. PKB, co jest najwyższym wskaźnikiem od czasu rozpadu ZSRR.
W 2025 r. Rosja zakłada przeznaczenie na obronność 11,8 bln rubli
(niemal 127 mld dol.) i 10,8 bln (116 mld dol.) w 2026 r. To wciąż ok. 8 razy mniej niż Stany Zjednoczone. Wyciągając wnioski z wojny w Ukrainie dotyczące niedostatecznego wyszkolenia żołnierzy, w latach 2024-2025 na ten cel ma być przeznaczonych 16,5 mld rubli (177 mln dol.) rocznie.
Większość zakładów zbrojeniowych znacząco zwiększyła zatrudnienie oraz przeszła na całodobowy system pracy. Od lutego 2022 r. Rosja zwiększyła produkcję czołgów 5,6 razy, transporterów opancerzonych 2,6 razy, bezzałogowców (w 2025 r. Rosja planuje wyprodukować ich 6 tys.) 16,6 razy oraz amunicji artyleryjskiej 17,5 razy.
...
O 150 proc. zwiększyły się zdolności wojskowych zakładów remontowych. W 2023 r. rozpoczęto też dostawy nowych zestawów indywidualnego wyposażenia żołnierza, które mają chronić przed odłamkami 70 proc. powierzchni ciała.
W 2023 r. siły zbrojne otrzymały 1530 nowych i zmodernizowanych czołgów oraz 2518 bojowych wozów piechoty i transporterów opancerzonych, 100 samolotów i 150 śmigłowców, 4 wielozadaniowe okręty podwodne, 3,5 tys. bezzałogowców oraz 16,5 mln sztuk pocisków różnych typów.
Rosyjska armia jest dziś znacznie silniejsza, niż podczas rozpoczęcia agresji na Ukrainę w 2022 r. Jej propaganda wciąż przypomina, że
Rosja nie walczy już z Ukrainą, ale z całym Zachodem. Do tego dysponuje prawie 5,6 tys. głowic jądrowych, którymi wciąż straszy.
Brazylia też nie żałuje pieniędzy na obronność
Brazylia
należy do grupy największych państw na świecie. Liczy ok. 210 mln ludzi. Większa część jej terytorium znajduje się w strefie równikowej, tropikalnej.
Mimo że produkt krajowy brutto jest mały, w 2019 r. wyniósł zaledwie 1,84 bln dol., to
Brazylia nie żałuje pieniędzy na obronność. Przeznacza na ten cel 1,5 proc. PKB, czyli ok. 26,9 mld dol
. Plasuje się na 11 miejscu pod względem wydatków zbrojeniowych na świecie. W Ameryce Południowej jest dominującą potęgą.
Wojaka operacyjne liczą 330 tys. ludzi, a w rezerwie jest 1,5 mln osób. Największy rodzaj sił zbrojnych Brazylii to wojska lądowe liczące 222 tys. żołnierzy, w tym 6 dywizji piechoty, liczne samodzielne bataliony szkoli się do walki w dżungli. Jest też dywizja spadochronowa i brygada piechoty górskiej.
W składzie wojsk lądowych jest ok. 70 tys. poborowych. Zasadnicza służba wojskowa trwa 12 miesięcy. Z uwagi na dużą ilość chętnych do służby zawodowej i ograniczone możliwości przyjęcia większej liczby poborowych, 95 proc. z nich otrzymuje odroczenie.
W czasie pokoju armia liczy 830 tys. ludzi, co jest porównywalne z siłami zbrojnymi Rosji. Mają na uzbrojeniu m.in. 350 czołgów Leopardy 1 i 91 jeszcze starszych wozów M60. Do tego dysponują ponad 400 wozami rozpoznawczymi Cascavel, 223 kołowymi transporterami Urutu własnej produkcji oraz 750 gąsienicowymi transporterami M113 i M577.
Na uzbrojeni żołnierzy jest też 150 samobieżnych 155 mm haubice M109 Paladin, a także trzy baterie po 20 wyrzutni krajowych systemy artylerii rakietowej ASTROS z pociskami 450 mm. Lotnictwo liczy 70 statków powietrznych, głównie samolotów F-5 Tiger II.
Swoją potęgę Brazylia stara się budować jednak raczej jako argument w polityce globalnej i zabezpieczenie wielkiego terytorium przed różnego rodzaju zagrożeniami. Przede wszystkim wewnętrznymi.
Jak dotąd tylko jedno państwo z wymienionych powyżej pozostaje w stanie wojny. To Rosja. I oby tak pozostało. Łatwo sobie wyobrazić armagedon, jaki czekałby świat, gdyby państwa BRICS połączyły się w sojuszu militarnym i wsparły Rosję.
Russia feigns indifference over U.S. election but roots quietly for Trump
Trump’s international agenda is more to the Kremlin’s tastes, but even his plans for ending the war in Ukraine might not be acceptable to Putin.
Former president Donald Trump at a campaign rally at Milwaukee's Fiserv Forum on Friday. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post)
MOSCOW — It appeared to be Russia’s strongest endorsement of a U.S. presidential candidate to date. Asked whether he had a preference for Donald Trump or Kamala Harris, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a sly smile.
“Our ‘favorite,’ if you can call it that, was the current president, Mr. Biden,” he told the audience at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in September. “But he was removed from the race, and he recommended all his supporters to support Ms. Harris. Well, we will do so — we will support her,” he added, his voice laced with irony, as he complimented her “expressive and infectious laugh.”
The Russian leader’s tongue-in-cheek remarks were a light, geopolitical gibe designed to mask a sense in Moscow that Russia would have a lot more to gain from a second Trump presidency even as it publicly downplays the importance of Tuesday’s U.S. elections.
In a clear sign of its interest, the Kremlin and Russia’s military intelligence service have directed multiple disinformation campaigns targeting Harris and her running mate, Tim Walz, as well as casting doubt on the validity of the vote, according to U.S. officials and documents previously reported on by The Washington Post.
For Putin, the U.S. election comes at a critical juncture, with the Russian leader and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky both facing growing pressures as Russia’s war against Ukraine stretches toward the end of its third year.
Ever since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin has sought to undermine Western support for Ukraine, promoting far-right isolationist views, and Trump’s candidacy dovetails with Moscow’s agenda, as he has repeatedly criticized U.S. spending on aid for Kyiv.
Women in Moscow walk past a cutout of Russian President Vladimir Putin and illustrations of Russian soldiers on Friday. (Yuri Kochetkov/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)
In Moscow, however, the mood on the surface so far is more muted and pointedly nonchalant than in past election years.
In 2016, Russia’s lower house of parliament, the state Duma, erupted in applause after Donald Trump was declared that election’s victor. Conservative activists organized election parties in Moscow, while Russian propagandists heralded Trump’s win as a new era for U.S.-Russian ties. Putin congratulated Trump on his victory in a telegram, expressing his hope that the new president would work with him to help “lead Russian-American relations out of their current state of crisis.”
But in the eight years since, relations have only worsened, especially since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Last year, Putin rescinded Russia’s ratification of the Nuclear Ban Treaty, which prohibited nuclear test explosions. And the dialogue between Moscow and Washington on matters of strategic security has all but dried up.
Can Trump fix relations?
Republican presidential nominee and former president Donald Trump talks with Tucker Carlson on Thursday in Phoenix. (Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)
Trump has suggested that he could improve ties, frequently speaking admiringly of Putin and telling Tucker Carlson, in an interview on Thursday, that he would pull Russia out of its deepening alliance with China and claiming repeatedly that he could stop the fighting in Ukraine in a day. Few in Moscow, however, say they believe Trump can pull off a complete turnaround in relations — especially after little changed during his first term.
“Of course they want Trump — that’s clear — but the result of this election will not be a game changer for Russia,” said a former Kremlin official who still operates in government circles and spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters. “The situation has become truly terrible. U.S.-Russian relations are in deadlock. And everyone is a hostage of it — even Putin.”
Russian state media has striven to cast the upcoming election as the trigger for a “new civil war” in America
(выделено а.п.), while propagandists have disproportionately attacked Harris and defended Trump, analysts say, recycling insults made by far-right outlets in the United States and repeating Kremlin statements.
Harris is often depicted as incoherent. TV pundits mock her laughter, and news coverage repeats disinformation falsely alleging that Harris has engaged in adulterous relationships and accusing her of championing the “radical LGBTQ+ agenda.”
“She’s at home in the kitchen, happy and harmonious, which is not the case when it comes to serious politics,” said propagandist Dmitry Kiselyov on his weekly show in September, as a clip of Harris appearing on a TV cooking show played behind him.
But generally, both candidates are still portrayed as two sides of the same coin of America’s global hegemony — they just have different strategies
(выделено а.п.),.
“They don’t seem to have the same illusions as in 2016,” said Francis Scarr, a journalist at BBC Monitoring, where he tracks and analyses Russian media narratives. “The underlying message to Russian viewers is that Trump is favorable, but TV channels are stopping short of praising or promoting him.”
Mikhail Zvinchuk, a founder of the Rybar Telegram channel, which tracks conflicts around the world, and who has been accused by the State Department of election interference and promoting Russian interests, told The Post that Russians who believe a Trump presidency will bring about change are “naive fools.”
“At Rybar, we are well aware that there are no Democrats or Republicans. There is a united party behind closed doors,” he said. “The rhetoric will change but the essence won’t.”
While much has been made of the murky ties between Trump and Putin, Russia felt it gained little from his first term, which saw a new raft of tough sanctions and disputes over the Russian Nord Stream gas pipeline to Germany. Many in Moscow fear that Trump could remain hostage to a strongly anti-Putin U.S. security establishment and don’t want to risk openly overpraising him for fear it will backfire.
“The president of the U.S. is not the same as the Russian president. He doesn’t have the same authority, and some of his decisions can be corrected or argued against on Capitol Hill. This makes us more cautious about the prospect of Trump coming to power,” said a Russian academic with close ties to senior Russian diplomats.
Chance to end the war
That said, inside Russia’s elite there is a growing expectation that Donald Trump will win and that if he does, there could be a chance to end the war with Ukraine on Moscow’s terms and potentially redraw the global security map.
“Investors expect that Trump will be elected,” said one well-connected Russian businessman, who also spoke on the condition of anonymity to talk about sensitive matters. Sergei Markov, a Kremlin-connected political analyst, said that he not only expected a Trump victory but that “on November 7, I expect that Trump will call Putin and Zelensky and propose an end to the military action.”
Harris, meanwhile, is an unknown entity, though the expectation is that the strong support for Ukraine would continue if she wins.
“We don’t even know yet who’s going to be part of her team,” the academic said. “Considering she doesn’t have much experience in foreign policy, a lot will depend on who is going to help her in this direction.”
Russian President Vladimir Putin applauds during the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok on Sept. 5. (Vyacheslav Prokofyev/AP)
Documents disclosed in September by the U.S. Department of Justice included one internal plan for Kremlin political strategists to promote a social media campaign to help secure the victory of “US Political Party A” in the presidential elections as its views include “provisions on peace in Ukraine in exchange for territories” as well as “returning troops home from all over the world etc.” Internal Kremlin documents make clear that Political Party A is the Republican Party.
“They have a clear preference for Trump to win. He’s more open to forcing Ukraine to concede and make some disadvantageous deal with Russia to end the war,” said Eric Ciaramella, a former White House official now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “They see him as much more likely to cut off support to Ukraine and as much more likely to damage America’s image abroad.”
Careful what you wish for
A Trump victory could still be fraught with risk for Russia, because it’s not clear whether Putin would agree to any deal proposed by Trump to end the war — possibly leading to bad blood between the two.
“There could be a window of opportunity, but it is very narrow and very fragile,” said Tatyana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.
JD Vance, the Republican nominee for vice president, has proposed a plan in which Russia would retain the land it has already taken and a demilitarized buffer zone would be established along the current front line. He also said Ukraine would have to accept neutrality.
Two former Trump advisers, Fred Fleitz and retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, have also proposed a plan that calls for a temporary cease-fire along current battle lines, while Ukraine would receive further Western supplies of weapons only if it enters into peace talks with Russia. Though these proposals have faced strong criticism for handing Ukrainian territory to Russia, analysts said it was not clear whether Russia could accept those conditions.
“For Putin, this is a very bad scenario,” Stanovaya said. “Putin doesn’t want territory. He wants Ukraine.”
She envisioned a series of meetings and discussions between Russia and the United States over Ukraine that would ultimately reach a dead end. “Trump is never going to propose to Putin what he wants in Ukraine.”
Putin would not be satisfied until the United States agrees to rebuild relations with Russia in a way that makes concessions to Moscow’s security concerns and redraws the global security map. Until then, Russia will continue to try to stoke chaos to weaken the United States, Stanovaya said.
Indeed, post-election chaos would greatly benefit Moscow, said the former Kremlin official. “The worse it is in the U.S., the better,” he said.
_________________
С умилением и понятными пожеланиями, Dimitriy.
Интересная и страшноватая тематическая статья (Киплинг нервно курил в сторонке):
Цитата:
There Will Always Be a Trump. That’s Only Part of the Problem.
Because we forget history, we forget that the American experiment cannot succeed without constant, courageous leadership. Our nation is not inherently good, and our high ideals are often eclipsed by our baser nature. This has been true since our founding, and it is true now.
We also know that if American ideals depend on a single party for their protection, then that effort is doomed to fail. It’s not that America is one election from extinction. Our nation is not that fragile. But it can regress. It can forsake its ideals. And millions of people can suffer as a result.
I’m writing those words in the context of a presidential contest that already represents a national failure. Even if Kamala Harris wins on Tuesday, there should be relief, not lasting joy. The United States will have come within an eyelash of electing a man who tried to overturn an election to cling to power.
While Donald Trump’s individual actions were unprecedented, the idea that a critical mass of Americans would embrace a demagogue should not be a surprise.
Last week I helped host a fireside chat with Susan Eisenhower, the founder and expert in residence at the Eisenhower Institute at Gettysburg College. She’s also Dwight D. Eisenhower’s granddaughter. During our conversation, she told a story that I’d forgotten — one with direct relevance to the present moment.
In the aftermath of World War II, there was intense interest in General Eisenhower’s potential political career. He’d never voted before he left the Army in 1948. Both parties courted him, but the Republican Party needed him.
By 1952, the G.O.P. hadn’t won a presidential election since 1928, it had just lost a campaign it was certain it would win (remember “Dewey Defeats Truman”?), and Senator Joseph McCarthy was already deep into the Red Scare.
To make matters much worse, the Republican Party’s prewar isolationism was asserting itself again. In 1951, shortly before Eisenhower took command of NATO, he met with the Republican senator Robert Taft. In her book about Eisenhower’s leadership, “How Ike Led,” Susan Eisenhower notes that Taft was a favorite for the next Republican presidential nomination, and General Eisenhower wanted to solicit Taft’s support for the Atlantic alliance.
Taft, however, indicated he was opposed to NATO. As Susan Eisenhower wrote, “Herbert Brownell, later Ike’s campaign manager, mused in his memoirs that everything would have been different if Taft had agreed to Eisenhower’s request to support NATO.”
One shouldn’t argue that Taft’s position was the only thing that influenced Ike. There was a grass-roots campaign to persuade him to run, but had Taft supported NATO, Eisenhower writes, “Ike would most likely have given no more consideration to the idea of running for president.”
But if Ike chose to run, why did he choose to run as a Republican? He was opposed to McCarthyism. He was opposed to isolationism. And both those positions were deeply embedded in the Republican Party.
The answer, Eisenhower told me in a phone call, was “sustainability.” The nation didn’t just need to prop up NATO for four more years. It needed a degree of bipartisan consensus. If American national security strategy depended on the same party winning every election, it was inherently unstable.
Ike was also influenced by a different Republican senator, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. of Massachusetts. In 1949, Lodge wrote an influential article in The Saturday Evening Post called “Does the Republican Party Have a Future?”
Lodge worried that the Republican Party had been “presented to the public as a rich man’s club and as a haven for reactionaries” (sound familiar?) But Lodge also wrote that “democracy required a two-party system, and that depended on the revitalization of the Republican Party.”
It seems almost incredible, looking back, that isolationism was arising once again. After World War I, the victorious Allies tried to create international institutions that would prevent future world wars, but America refused to participate. The Senate rejected the League of Nations, America retreated to its borders, and the remaining Allies lacked the will to resist the rise of Adolf Hitler, even when he was at his most vulnerable.
At the same time, however, there were reasons for American fatigue. More than 400,000 Americans had died in World War II. Thousands more had died so far in the Korean War, and the war itself was locked in a bloody stalemate.
Ike stepped up. He joined and — for a time — helped transform the Republican Party. By the end of his first term, McCarthyism was largely a spent force. By the end of his second term, Republican isolationism was on the wane. There was, in fact, a postwar consensus. American alliances were stabilized, NATO became one of the most sustainable (and successful) military alliances in history, and there hasn’t been a great-power war since.
I recall that history in part because we once again face the rise of isolationism and reactionary populism, and many Americans of my generation — who grew up entirely within the postwar consensus — are asking an anguished question, “Is this who we are?”
Our patriotism should never be interpreted
to mean that America is inherently better than every other countries or that Americans are inherently better people than the people of other nations. There is nothing about being born within this country’s boundaries that improves the raw human clay of its citizens.
And when you read history with open eyes, that reality has been plain for more than 400 years, since the first European settlers set foot on these shores. Every single human vice of the Old World was replicated in the new, sometimes at awful scale.
And those vices were not momentary blips in the American story. We’ve still lived longer with slavery and Jim Crow than we have with equal protection under the law. We’ve lived longer with religious discrimination than we’ve lived with religious liberty.
At the same time, however, millions of Americans throughout history have stood in their own ways against the vices of their times. American virtue is rooted in their courage and in the courage and wisdom of key leaders, at crucial times, who restrained our worst impulses and called us to our highest ideals.
But wisdom and courage have hardly been constants in American life. The immense progress we’ve made in the United States in eradicating our besetting sins hasn’t been uniform. It’s been episodic, with periods of great progress marred by decades of terrible backsliding.
The same nation that ratified the Bill of Rights in 1791 also sharply limited its application, and states were free to violate the rights of their citizens at will. The same nation that ratified the 14th Amendment in 1868, launched Reconstruction, and elected Black Americans to statehouses and Congress permitted the white supremacists of the Confederacy to reassert their authority and impose Jim Crow.
Americans are frequently ignorant of our sins and regressions. When I speak to audiences about American history, I sometimes ask a series of questions. How old were you when you first heard about the Tulsa Race Massacre? Are you familiar with the Philadelphia Bible Riots? Do you know what Blaine Amendments are? Have you ever heard of the Battle of Blair Mountain? Rare is the person who knows of more than one of these American tragedies.
I don’t do this to argue that America is uniquely bad — or to discourage patriotism — but to introduce a sense of sobriety and seriousness to our political participation. We cannot, in fact, rest on the shoulders of previous generations. We have our own work to do.
What is true of the nation as a whole
is also true of the conservative movement. When Trump clinched the Republican nomination yet again this year, I thought of one of the best books I’ve read about American conservatism, “The Right: The Hundred-Year War for American Conservatism” by the American Enterprise Institute’s Matthew Continetti.
It’s a masterly history, and it demonstrates that the right has never been a single movement with a single ideology. It’s long been a coalition of competing factions, and in the years following the Republican Party’s inspiring battle against slavery and disunion, it has too often been tempted by reaction, isolationism and xenophobia.
By the end of Trump’s term, Continetti writes, the right had yielded to those old temptations. Trump left office “with the Republican Party out of power, conservatism in disarray and the right in the same hole it had dug with Charles Lindbergh, Joe McCarthy, the John Birch Society, George Wallace and Pat Buchanan. Not only was the right unable to get out of the hole, it did not want to.”
That was true in 2022. It is doubly true now. Republican primary voters overwhelmingly rejected the only viable candidate of the postwar consensus, Nikki Haley. Eisenhower would recognize her commitment to NATO, for example. And the mention of Charles Lindbergh was perhaps more prescient than Continetti could imagine.
It was hard to watch Trump’s hateful, racist rally in Madison Square Garden and not remember that Lindbergh had used the same perch to make his “America first” case against intervention in World War II in 1941. Or that the German American Bund had sponsored its own Pro American Rally in 1939, one that placed a 30-foot image of George Washington right next to swastikas.
There is nothing new under the sun.
After I read Continetti’s book, it was clearer to me than ever before that I was born in an unusual time. By the time I came of age, the renewal of conservatism that had begun under Eisenhower was in full swing under Reagan. In 1981, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the Democratic senator (and Democratic intellectual leader) from New York, said, “Of a sudden, the G.O.P. has become the party of ideas.”
It was a mistake for anyone to believe the transformation was permanent — that the isolationism and reactionary populism of the past had been discarded. There was even a term, “paleoconservatives,” for the few remaining old-right stalwarts. Their ideology seemed as extinct as the Stone Age.
In hindsight, however, it is clear that this new consensus was unstable. As Continetti writes, “What began as an elite-driven defense of the classical liberal principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution of the United States ended up, in the first quarter of the 21st century, as a furious reaction against elites of all stripes.”
Note that phrase — “elite driven.” The transformation of the Republican Party that began with Eisenhower was top down, not bottom up. And we can easily name the individuals who were most responsible. William F. Buckley Jr. energized conservative thought in the pages of National Review. Ronald Reagan turned conservatism into a governing ideology, one that was rooted in three clear concepts: a strong national defense, social conservatism and limited government.
An emphasis on individual liberty replaced an emphasis on moral authority, and isolationism became a dirty word in official Republican circles.
But the base instincts of the right never went away, not entirely. In 1992, Patrick Buchanan’s pitchfork populism briefly threatened to derail George H.W. Bush’s nomination, and the rise of Ross Perot signaled that populism was still a potent force in American politics.
All the signs were there. The backsliding was about to begin.
We should be careful to note that there were good reasons reactionary populism ultimately found such fertile soil. The Iraq war had been long, deadly and frustrating. By the time Trump won his first race, the war in Afghanistan had been underway for more than 15 years, and there was no end in sight.
At home, the Great Recession had wrecked the financial security of millions of Americans, and the recovery was agonizingly slow. Americans were learning a new term, “deaths of despair,” to describe a tragic increase in deaths by drug overdose, suicide and alcohol-related diseases.
By many measures, the American elite had failed the American people, and the same elite (especially the Republican elite) proved incapable of responding to the rise of Trump.
I started my story with Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Let me end with Mitch McConnell. In one sense, it’s unfair to compare the two men. When Eisenhower made his decision to revitalize the Republican Party, he was an unquestioned American hero. Republicans and Democrats courted him because he was one of the country’s most beloved figures, and he became the last in a long line of generals to serve as president.
McConnell is a capable politician — and by many accounts a masterly legislative leader — but he’s not a war hero, and he has never enjoyed any real degree of public adoration. But in January 2021, he had a chance to end Donald Trump’s political career.
Ten House Republicans had joined House Democrats to impeach Trump, and he faced a trial in the Senate. No one can know for certain that McConnell could have secured enough Republican votes to convict Trump, but we know that he did not try. We know that he not only voted to acquit Trump; he later criticized Liz Cheney, the Republican House leader whose opposition to Trump ultimately destroyed her political career.
In October, The Atlantic published a fascinating excerpt from “The Price of Power: How Mitch McConnell Mastered the Senate, Changed America, and Lost His Party,” by Michael Tackett, the deputy Washington bureau chief of The Associated Press. McConnell told Tackett that Cheney’s “self-sacrificial act maybe sells books, but it isn’t going to have an impact changing the party. That’s where we differed.”
That’s an incredible statement. The Republican Party wouldn’t change with Trump permanently disqualified from federal office? Everything we know about Trump’s career tells us that he has a unique influence on Republican hearts and minds. None of his imitators have replicated his popularity or his success. Yes, he exploited existing reactionary populism on the right, but he nurtures and feeds it.
We also know from history that populists can be shamed, humiliated and defeated. We know from history that leadership can make a difference. McCarthyism died when leaders of both parties said: Enough. Richard Nixon resigned when Republican leaders told him it was time.
And the American people responded. It turned out that the longing for McCarthy and loyalty to Nixon were temporary. They appealed to the American id, yet ultimately the better angels of our nature emerged. But it didn’t happen simply because the American people made that decision on their own.
Instead of leading, McConnell punted back to the Republican rank and file. Perhaps he’d seen the polling that indicated that Republicans still stood by Trump. Perhaps he had excessive faith that the American legal system would respond with the necessary speed and competence to hold Trump accountable. Maybe he thought after Jan. 6, Trump was finished politically.
He was wrong. I’m haunted by the last lines of Tackett’s Atlantic piece: “McConnell’s goal was to preserve a Senate majority. He wanted the energy of Trump’s voters in Senate races, without the baggage of Trump. He gambled on his belief that Trump would fade from the political stage in the aftermath of the insurrection. Instead, Trump re-emerged every bit as strong among core supporters. It was likely the worst political miscalculation of McConnell’s career.”
For members of a party that claims to revere the American founders, contemporary Republicans are quick to discard their wisdom. There’s no question that the founders did not entirely trust the American elite. There are ample democratic checks on government power. But it is equally clear that they did not trust the American majority. They knew the passions of the people could be stoked by demagogues.
Eisenhower knew that it was his role to put his thumb on the scales. The old forces of reaction and isolation had to be kept at bay, and that would require both parties to create a sustainable strategy for deterring and ultimately defeating the Soviet Union. He worked assiduously behind the scenes to undermine McCarthy. He succeeded on both counts and helped alter American politics for generations.
McConnell, by contrast, did exactly what the founders were afraid of; he delegated his moral and constitutional responsibilities to the Republican majority, the same people who were already indicating that Trump was still their man.
The people are not always right. Moral courage is always necessary in leadership. And we cannot ever think that we have permanently vanquished the ideas that Trump and so many others before him have used to lead so many Americans astray.
_________________
С сожалением и понятными пожеланиями, Dimitriy.
Майя Санду заявила о своей победе на президентских выборах в Молдавии.
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Pro-EU Maia Sandu ahead in Moldovan election in setback for Kremlin
Incumbent is leading runoff in early voting and is expected to take most overseas votes to defeat Russia-leaning rival
...
Early results indicate that the large Moldovan diaspora, accounting for about 20% of the electorate, is overwhelmingly voting for Sandu.
…
The EU has promised a
€1.8bn
(выделено а.п.) multiyear package for Moldova to help it on the accession path which the country officially began in June. Sandu has pledged to “work night and day” to take Moldova into the EU by 2030.
…
Officials in the capital of Chișinău believe that Moscow invested approximately
$100m (£77.2m)
(выделено а.п.) before the first vote and had reportedly smuggled in some of the funds by “money mules” detained by police at the main airport while carrying bundles of €10,000 (£8,390) in cash.
…
Ukraine, whose president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, has repeatedly praised Sandu, will breathe a sigh of relief, as many in Kyiv have been anxious about the prospect of a Russia-friendly president leading the country that borders them.
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По факту получается следующее. Жители Молдовы проголосовали и против евроинтеграции, и против режима Санду. Однако Запад, руками диаспоры, предварительно лишив конституционного права голосовать диаспору в России, добивается нужного им результата. Можно констатировать, что жители Молдовы находятся в заложниках западной диаспоры, которой фактически плевать и на Молдову, и на молдован.
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Санду, проиграв выборы Стояногло внутри страны, потеряла доверие граждан и стала "хромой уткой", "президентом диаспоры", заявил экс-президент Молдавии Додон.
Как и прогнозировала «Страна», во втором туре победила действующий президент Майя Санду.
Однако итоги выборов стали для нее не триумфом, а предвестником больших проблем уже в следующем году, когда состоятся выборы в парламент.
Во-первых, она стала президентом исключительно благодаря голосам европейской диаспоры. Если брать итоги выборов в самой Молдове, то там победил оппозиционер-социалист Стояноглу.
Во-вторых, она не смогла победить в первом туре. А выход с ней во второй тур кандидата от социалистов Стояноглу серьёзно улучшило перспективы Соцпартии на парламентских выборах.
В-третьих, если сравнивать с результатами президентских выборов в 2020 году, то Майя взяла меньше, чем (57,7% тогда и 55,2% сейчас), а ее противник больше (42,3% Додон в 2020 году и 44,7% Стояноглу в 2024 году).
В-четвертых, фактически провалился инициированный Санду референдум о евроинтеграции, где количество голосов «за» лишь на мизерный процент превысило число голосов «против» (и опять же – только лишь за счет голосов диаспоры). Что показало как раскол в молдавском обществе, так и крайне неоднозначное отношение к Санду. А также то, что президент и его вертикаль не в полной мере контролирует политические процессы в государстве.
Все это в совокупности делает для партии Санду крайне проблематичной победу на предстоящих в следующем году выборах в парламент Молдовы. Парламент формирует правительство, в руках которого находится львиная доля властных полномочий в стране.
Уже понятно, что много возьмут социалисты. Также, скорее всего, на парламентские выборы пойдет популярный мэр Кишинева Ион Чабан, который может забрать немало голосов и у партии Санду. Пойдут на выборы и другие силы – как пророссийские, так и выступающие под евроинтеграционными лозунгами (то есть – отбирающие голоса у партии президента). И окончательный «дизайн» нового парламента будет зависеть от того, какие из этих партий смогут преодолеть проходной барьер, а какие останутся «за бортом», унося с собой «в никуда» голоса, отобранные у более крупных политсил своего политического спектра.
Но, в общем и целом, на будущих выборах партия президента, скорее всего, потеряет большинство и парламенте (на прошлых выборах в 2021 году она взяла 53%) и ей будет крайне непросто сформировать вокруг себя коалицию для создания правительства.
[url= Материал полностью.[/url]
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Никакой неожиданности второй тур выборов в Молдове не принёс. Было с самого начала понятно, что госпожа Санду использует ровно тот же самый сценарий, который был две недели назад, то есть ночью вбросит голоса за счёт зарубежных участков.
Чрезвычайно удобно.
Половина участков вообще не работает. Бюллетеней прислали меньше, чем там есть избирателей. Никаких иностранных наблюдателей, никаких представителей Венецианской комиссии. Делай что хочу. Это и было продемонстрировано.
ЦИК начала подсчёт голосов. Всё время побеждает Стояногло, потом могучий вброс — и на несколько процентов вперёд выходит Санду. Задача, поставленная куратором из Госдепа США Хоганом, блестяще реализована.
Единственный прокол допустила Центральная избирательная комиссия, зачем-то написав, что вот такая-то цифра — это результаты по Молдове и такая-то цифра — за рубежом.
Это первые выборы в истории Молдовы, судьба которых решалась диаспорой. Она всегда была очень многочисленной, потому что значительная часть молдаван проживает за пределами царствования госпожи Санду, но никогда диаспора не оказывала такого воздействия — по формальной причине — на результат.
Я не думаю, что стоит сейчас ждать каких-то могучих протестных процессов, по той лишь причине, что молдавская оппозиция славится тем, что там все ненавидят друг друга. Достаточно посмотреть, как, например, ряд оппозиционеров отзывались о представителях блока «Победа» (об Илане Шоре и о Марине Таубер). Кто и как их может сейчас всех объединить? Мне кажется, эта миссия невыполнима совершенно.
Важен ещё один момент — эти выборы по большому счёту малозначительны. Молдова — республика парламентская. И парламентские выборы там будут в следующем году. И вот здесь чрезвычайно важно правильно использовать это время. Понимать, что власть просто так Санду не отдаст.
Вы знаете, была такая крепкая иллюзия в Молдове, что можно будет прийти и показать шестому интернационалу беззубых политических конокрадов своё фи. На референдуме так не получилось, потому что некоторые призывали к бойкоту — и этих голосов в результате не хватило. То же самое по большому счёту случилось и сейчас во втором туре.
Но если этот год представители молдавской оппозиции проведут с осмыслением и пользой для себя, то дать очень серьёзный бой этой абсолютно воровской и антимолдавской власти оппозиция вполне сможет. Дело, повторяю, за тем, чтобы осмыслить и понять изменившуюся специфику. Это, собственно, и отличает политиков.
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Публицист Дмитрий Чубашенко считает, что скоро выборы в Молдове потеряют всякий смысл, потому что все решают за пределами страны.
"Если не начать хотя бы обсуждать, как отрегулировать голосование на зарубежных участках, через два-три электоральных цикла вся эта вакханалия приведет к тому, что голосование в самой Молдове утратит смысл, потому что и президента, и парламент, и возможно, местные органы власти будет избирать диаспора"
, — считает Чубашенко.
▪️Чубашенко напомнил, что в Армении, Израиле и ряде других демократических государств голосовать за пределами страны запрещено.
" Понимая, что это выглядит слишком радикально, можно ввести мораторий на такое голосование на один электоральный цикл (выборы следующих парламента и президента) и провести широкую дискуссию по регулированию этого права с применением международной практики"
, — пишет он.
"Но даже на такое вряд ли кто-то из молдавских политиков осмелится", признает публицист.
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Партия социалистов Молдавии отказалась признать итоги голосования на зарубежных участках, благодаря которым, по их словам, Санду была объявлена победителем.
Там подчеркнули, что эти результаты нельзя считать демократическим выражением воли народа — Санду стала «президентом диаспоры».
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Громкая ПОБЕДА Санду: молдавское общество продемонстрировало ЗРЕЛОСТЬ!
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Ediție Specială➡la Moldova 1
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Vladislav Culminschi, director executiv, Institutul pentru Inițiative Strategice, la Moldova 1
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Maia Sandu obține un nou mandat: Pacea și speranța într-o viață mai bună au învins.
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Ce înseamnă victoria Maiei Sandu în Moldova, deși a pierdut în țară și a câștigat în diaspora.
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По скромному мнению а.п., ситуация в Молдове начнет изменяться после начала агрессии ВСМ, ВСР (НАТО) и ВСУ в Приднестровье, а нормализуется после разгрома ВСУ, ВСР (НАТО) и ВСМ в одесской области.
Should the U.S. sell its tanks? I’m answering your questions.
...
Should the U.S. sell its tanks?
Guest
8:12 p.m.
The retired CEO of Google made the comment that in his view, the US should sell or give away all of the tanks in inventory, and invest those funds in drones of various types. Is he on to something?
David Ignatius
Yes. We have definitely entered the era of drone warfare. The battlefield is transparent. Tanks and other armored vehicles can't hide, and they're vulnerable to attack from suicide drones and munitions dropped on their vulnerable top surface. The former CEO you're mentioning, described to a Ukrainian audience in Kyiv in early September what the front line looked like when he visited--thousands of drones on both sides and movement by troops impossible except at dawn and dusk when the drones' optical and infrared sensors were weak. It's a new world of warfare, for sure.
What is your opinion regarding Putin and his nuclear blackmail? Is he a serious nuclear threat?
Matt in Monterey
8:18 p.m.
I am a former US Navy intelligence officer, and early in my service, I was an analyst focused on Russia. So, I have known a lot about Putin in the past. However, it seems that something in him has changed. He has now put together a loose alliance with several of America's enemies. And has escalated his threats to release nuclear weapons in Ukraine. I am deeply concerned that sentiments of isolationism in the United States may lead us to back away from our agreements from 30 years ago to support and defend Ukraine in exchange for their disarmament. In turn, I worry that this will eventually lead to a situation where we are forced to intervene with greater risk to ourselves. After all, that has only happened twice in the last century. Ultimately, this may all be moot. WWIII may already have begun.
David Ignatius
US intelligence analysts tell me that Putin's threats to use tactical nuclear weapons are real--but that he's more likely to retaliate "horizontally" by widening the threat to NATO and other US allies. Russia's new use of North Korean troops against Ukraine, and its expanded defense cooperation with NK--which would threaten our allies Japan and South Korea--is an example. So is Russia's threat to supply advanced missiles to the Houthis (which I think was stopped partly by Chinese disapproval). The danger for the West is that Putin is using these threats to compel outcomes that he couldn't get otherwise on the battlefield--i.e., that he's blackmailing us. Best approach to a blackmailer is legal sanctions--and, failing that, a punch in the nose.
Why has Ukraine not built more lines of defensive fortifications?
Nate
8:21 p.m.
With the continued Russian advances in Eastern Ukraine it becomes increasingly more clear that the battlefield has not been prepared to give Ukraine the best chance at success. Was this just a question of too few resources? It just seems like digging ditches and putting trench lines in place is something that could have been done at anytime between 2014 and 2024, and for minor costs in the grand scheme of things.
David Ignatius
I'm told Ukraine is now building a line to protect its territory from Russian advances toward the Dnipro. But I agree that these defenses have been too late and probably too little. The only explanation, I suspect, is Zelensky's reluctance to admit that the war has become a defense stalemate and that Ukrainian hopes for an offensive that could liberate all territory are unrealistic.
Will North Korean troops fighting for Russia be exiled?
Daren
8:23 p.m.
When Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown, NK citizens working abroad were permanently exiled. Presumably to prevent any news from reaching the NK general public that an autocrat could be deposed by his own people.
Given the experience & worldview that the NK troops now fighting for Russia will be freshly exposed to, would Kim Jong Un & the NK ruling elite tolerate these men returning home? Or are they likely to be considered so completely loyal that this would not be of concern to Kim?
David Ignatius
Fascinating point. By agreeing to send his troops abroad, Kim has broken the NK bubble. They will come home, as troops always do from foreign wars, with a sense of a wider world and also a desire to be rewarded for their service--both potentially dangerous for Kim's closed regime. He must be getting a LOT in return to make him willing to take these risks.
…
What happened to Ukrainian manpower?
Guest
8:35 p.m.
One of the key justifications for setting Ukraine's conscription minimum age so high is that there are so few younger men due to a collapsing birth rate. Why did the birth rate collapse so badly? Just a cultural issue?
also--why don't they add women to the pool of conscripts?
David Ignatius
Can't answer either question adequately. In an interview last month with Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, he told me that the conscription issue was so "toxic" politically that a colleague warned him that it was like drinking water from Chernobyl. Seems to me Zelensky has to make hard political choices to boost Ukraine's manpower, because this is becoming the country's biggest vulnerabiity.
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What fallout do you expect for Ukraine and Israel if Trump wins?
lbmd
8:42 p.m.
While escalation is occurring on both fronts, there seems to be “holding back” on rhetoric pending the outcome of our elections. Harris pushes for ceasefire and two states; Trump told both Putin and Netanyahu “do want you want”. Very different policies.
David Ignatius
Harris does seem more commited to the ceasefires, but that's rhetoric. And the truth is, Biden says "do what you want" because he knows that (realistically) he can't stop Bibi. On holding back, I sense that for now things are on hold, pending tomorrow's voting. Talking to Lebanese officials last week, they would typically preface their comments by saying: "Depending on what happens November 5..."
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Could there be a ceasefire in Ukraine?
Guest
8:53 p.m.
With the Ukraine war gravitating to a defense stalemate, would you see either new Administration in Washington pressing for a negotiated ceasefire to end the hostilities?
David Ignatius
I think that whoever wins tomorrow, there will be a new focus on ending this terrible war--I hope on terms that don't reward Putin's aggression.
Has China overplayed its hand?
Guest
8:56 p.m.
China obviously loves poking the US by propping up Putin and Kim but isn't their economy built on trade with western markets? Do they want North Korea and Russia getting more reckless? And how does this budding alliance with Iran work for them? Does Xi really relish working with religious and nationalistic fanatics? Seems like bad business.
David Ignatius
China has liked seeing the US in difficulty, tied sown with all these conflicts, but I share your view that Xi would regard a more aggressive and better armed North Korea as a danger to stability in the northeast Pacific and to Chinese security. Unfortunately, the Xi-Putin relationship goes very deep, and the Chinese now make no secret that they want Putin to "win."
How and when will the Ukraine war end?
LiveAloha
8:59 p.m.
How and when will the Ukraine war end? The only ones winning, as usual, are the Defense Industry
David Ignatius
It will end with a negotiated settlement, in which both sides will make some concessions. The question is when that will happen, and how many more will die in this terrible conflict launched by Putin without any legal justification.
Цитата:
The Perfect Has Become the Enemy of the Good in Ukraine
Why Washington Must Redefine Its Objectives
...
Well into the September 10 debate between the U.S. presidential candidates, ABC News anchor David Muir posed a question to Republican nominee Donald Trump: “Do you want Ukraine to win this war?”
Trump refused to answer directly. “I want the war to stop,” he said. When Muir repeated the question, Trump again evaded: “I think it’s in the U.S. best interest to get this war finished and just get it done.”
Many observers were critical of Trump’s refusal to espouse support for Ukraine in its war against Russian aggression. Yet the former president is hardly the only person refusing to directly answer such a query. Most American national security experts, including U.S. President Joe Biden’s foreign policy team, have said they want Ukraine to defeat Russia. But they have refused to define what, exactly, that means, often saying it is for Ukraine to decide.
If pressed, most would indeed probably define winning in a way similar to how Kyiv defines it, including in its most recent “victory plan”: ousting Russian troops from the entirety of Ukraine’s territory, Crimea included, and reestablishing control over its 1991 borders. There is good reason for adopting this definition. The most basic, if not always honored, norm of international order—one that has endured for some 400 years—is that borders are to be respected. Territory is not to be acquired through the threat or use of armed force. This was one of the main reasons why the United States and other countries rallied to defend South Korea in 1950 and Kuwait in 1990.
Yet although this definition is desirable, it is ultimately unworkable. In principle, Ukraine could liberate its lost territory if the United States and its European partners intervened with forces of their own. But this would require jettisoning the indirect strategy they chose in 2022. It would come at great human, military, and economic cost. And it would introduce far greater risk, as it would mean war between NATO and nuclear-armed Russia. For this reason, such a policy will not be adopted.
Instead of clinging to an infeasible definition of victory, Washington must grapple with the grim reality of the war and come to terms with a more plausible outcome. It should still define victory as Kyiv remaining sovereign and independent, free to join whatever alliances and associations it wants. But it should jettison the idea that, to win, Kyiv needs to liberate all its land. So as the United States and its allies continue to arm Ukraine, they must take the uncomfortable step of pushing Kyiv to negotiate with the Kremlin—and laying out a clear sense of how it should do so.
Such a pivot may be unpopular. It will take political courage to make, and it will require care to implement. But it is the only way to end the hostilities, preserve Ukraine as a truly independent country, enable it to rebuild, and avoid a dire outcome for both Ukraine and the world.
WHAT IS AND WHAT WILL NEVER BE
For Kyiv, a return to 1991 borders is militarily unachievable. The disparity between the manpower and equipment of Russia and Ukraine is simply too great. History suggests that to expel Russia from Crimea or the Donbas, Ukraine would need forces some three times more numerous and capable than Moscow’s, and Russia has a population at least three times larger and a much bigger industrial base. Russian defensive positions are well fortified, and it has received arms and technical assistance from China, Iran, and North Korea. There is no reason to assume it will not receive more such help over time. In October, after all, North Korea deepened its involvement by deploying thousands of its troops to Russia for use in the war effort.
Kyiv, meanwhile, needs most of its forces just to defend the approximately 80 percent of Ukrainian territory it still controls. It especially needs them right now: in recent weeks, Russian forces have gained control of additional territory in the east. Ukraine is trying to build up a more formidable arsenal, but it lacks much in the way of defense manufacturing capability. Its Western partners are helping, but they lack the ability to produce enough arms and ammunition to give Kyiv all it wants while meeting their other commitments. The United States needs enough arms to help not just Ukraine but also partners such as Israel and Taiwan (as well as to provide for itself). Washington could and arguably should provide Kyiv with more sophisticated systems and loosen the constraints on U.S. provisions for their use. But there is no game-changing weapon or lifted restriction that would allow Ukraine to simultaneously defend what it already controls and liberate what it does not.
Many analysts refuse to publicly acknowledge these realities, in part out of fear that doing so would embolden Russia and demoralize Ukraine. But articulating an impossible definition of winning creates its own political problems.
Doing so has, for example, handed American and European opponents—or, more generously, skeptics—of providing Ukraine with additional military aid a powerful argument. The West, they say, is spending tens of billions of dollars on a policy that has little or no chance of succeeding while threatening to reduce its readiness in other theaters, where some analysts say greater U.S. interests are at stake.“Fundamentally, we lack the capacity to manufacture the amount of weapons Ukraine needs us to supply to win the war,” wrote Republican vice presidential nominee JD Vance, in April. “These weapons,” he continued, “are not only needed by Ukraine.”
Ukraine and its supporters are pursuing a policy that is unlikely to succeed but sure to be costly.
By not offering a realistic definition of victory, the West is also reducing the pressure on Russia by leaving little room for serious diplomacy. Each protagonist is left free to pursue its maximalist aims. This is not to suggest Russia and Ukraine are morally equivalent; they are not. But without a real Western diplomatic effort, Russian President Vladimir Putin can argue that his regime is not the principal obstacle to ending the war, citing the United States’ and Europe’s refusals to negotiate. The result is less international and internal pressure on the Kremlin. Western sanctions against Russia are widely ignored, and Putin is increasingly welcome at major international forums—including, for example, the October BRICS summit.
The continuation of the war, meanwhile, is devastating Ukraine. The country has suffered over 300,000 casualties, a staggering number—even if only half of Russia’s losses. The Ukrainian economy is expected to grow by only three percent this year after having contracted by some 30 percent in 2022. Continued conflict makes it impossible for the country to begin serious rebuilding, as few will want to invest in structures that could again be reduced to rubble. It also increases the ultimate cost of rebuilding, which has already reached an estimated $500 billion. And the endless fighting is immiserating Ukrainian citizens, who now suffer from regular shortages of electricity caused by Russian attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure and the open-ended military service required of many Ukrainian men. It is thus no surprise that Ukrainians are increasingly leaving their state. Roughly six million of them now live elsewhere, a number that includes many military-age men.
In short, Ukraine and its supporters find themselves pursuing a policy that is unlikely to succeed but sure to be costly. Time will not make things better. Fatigue is setting in, both inside Ukraine and among its backers. The war’s trajectory is neither desirable nor sustainable.
Ukrainians are aware of these facts. It is why, in October, President Volodymyr Zelensky released his “victory plan.” But despite the accompanying fanfare, Zelensky’s proposal provides little guidance on how Ukraine can overcome the many challenges the country faces. The plan lists the security guarantees and economic support Ukraine wants, but not the outcome it desires. It calls for the “madmen in the Kremlin to lose the ability to continue the war,” but it fails to define any diplomatic objectives other than that “Russia must permanently lose control over Ukraine and even the desire for such control.” It offers, in other words, no realistic strategy that Ukraine’s partners can support. It is not a plan for victory, but a prescription for continued war. If Kyiv’s allies walk away, it could end up being a prescription for defeat.
THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE
The prospect of Ukraine losing—or ceasing to be a truly independent country, out from under Russia’s sway—would constitute a serious blow to international order and to European security. It would increase the risk from Russia to other parts of Europe, weaken the confidence of the West, and signal to China (and possibly North Korea) that the West may not have the ability and resolve needed to defeat aggression. It would weaken the norm against conquest. And it would, of course, be terrible for the Ukrainian people.
There is, however, an alternative strategy to both indefinite war and Kyiv’s defeat. It involves continued Western support for Ukraine and opposition to Russia. But it also requires straight talk with Ukraine’s leadership along with limited incentives for Moscow.
At the core of such a revamped strategy is a more modest definition of winning—but one that still protects fundamental Western and Ukrainian interests while denying Putin many of his war aims. The objective should be keeping Ukraine an independent, sovereign, and economically viable country. It must be free to choose its political system and leadership. The country must also be free to rearm and maintain a military of whatever size it wants, to join the European Union, and to accept security commitments from outsiders. It needs to have economic access to the Black Sea.
Kyiv does not require 100 percent of its territory to realize these goals. But what, then, does it need? An end to the war, above all. That end does not mandate a permanent settlement that addresses all the issues separating Russia and Ukraine. Indeed, it should not at this juncture, as any overly ambitious diplomatic undertaking would surely fail. Instead, what the country needs now is an interim cessation of hostilities that largely reflects current realities on the ground.
There is an alternative to both indefinite war and Kyiv’s defeat.
To bring this about, the United States and its partners in Europe should initiate a dialogue with Ukraine. The goal would be to persuade its leaders to accept this more modest definition of winning. They should tell Kyiv that Western support cannot be expected to continue at or near current levels without it. But they should also make an ironclad pledge to do everything in their power to provide Ukraine with arms for the long haul. The bulk of these arms would be made available on the condition that they be used for defensive purposes, but certain longer-range systems could be used by Ukraine against military and economic targets in Russia. The aim would be to signal to Moscow that it will not prevail on the battlefield now or in the future and that it will pay a high price for trying. Additional carrots for Ukraine are most likely to be found in the economic realm.
Diplomacy would take place in two phases. The first phase would seek to bring about a cease-fire, either along current battle lines or with limited adjustments, with a buffer zone separating the two protagonists. It would end the bloodshed and allow Ukraine to rebuild. It would not require the country to give up or compromise on any of its legal or political claims when it comes to borders. There could be some sort of international presence to monitor the agreement. It might be modeled in some ways on the cease-fire that has maintained peace in Cyprus for 50 years.
A second phase of diplomacy would start as soon as the first phase is done. This second phase would be much more prolonged—perhaps lasting decades, until Russia has a post-Putin leadership interested in reintegrating the country into the West. It would address additional arrangements, including what are often termed final-status issues. This phase could involve territorial transfers in both directions and a degree of autonomy for the inhabitants of Crimea and Ukraine’s east. It would also involve the creation of a security guarantee for Ukraine, even though the history of such guarantees is mixed. (The discredited 1994 Budapest Memorandum clearly did not offer real protection.) Ideally, this guarantee would involve NATO membership for Kyiv. But a coalition of the willing, including the United States, could offer Ukraine a security pledge if NATO members prove reluctant to admit Ukraine.
Foreign policy must be doable as well as desirable.
Critics of diplomacy argue that Russia will not abide by any agreement it signs and that it will instead use a cease-fire as a chance to regroup before continuing its offensive. This is, of course, possible. But a credible long-term commitment by the West to provide military help to Ukraine, along with fewer restrictions on how Ukraine could use long-range systems, would increase the cost of the war to Russia and challenge Putin’s assumption that he can outlast the West. At the same time, there is something in this proposal for Putin that might prompt him to respect its terms. It would not require Russia to give up claims to Ukraine. Moscow could continue to rearm. It would keep, for now, most or all of the Ukrainian territory it controls. The West might even agree to lift some sanctions on the Russian economy, and should Russia respect the cease-fire, lift more later—although important sanctions would remain in place to provide leverage for diplomacy’s second phase. As part of that second phase, the West might ask Ukraine to forswear nuclear weapons. NATO, while admitting Ukraine, could pledge not to station its forces on Ukraine’s territory.
If accepted, the first phase of this diplomatic initiative would help preserve Ukraine’s independence and allow it to start rebuilding. But even if rejected, the initiative should make it less difficult to galvanize continued military and economic support for Ukraine. It would highlight that it really is Putin’s ambitions, not Zelensky’s, that stand in the way of an end to the fighting. Either way, Ukraine would be better off than it is now.
To some, what is described here may not sound like winning. It is arguably neither fair nor just. It does not promise peace. But it would be incomparably better than the alternative of Ukraine losing the war or fighting endlessly. This approach would deny Putin much of what he seeks, which is to bring most or all of Ukraine back under Moscow’s thumb. Foreign policy must be doable as well as desirable. The comparison analysts should make is not between what exists and the ideal, but between the possible and the alternative.
FIGHTING CHANCE
As of this writing, there are approximately 75 days remaining in Biden’s presidency. Biden should use that time to do all he can to increase the odds that the United States adopts this new strategy for Ukraine, one that is accepted by both U.S. allies and Kyiv.
He should do so no matter who wins on November 5. A president-elect Kamala Harris would benefit from Biden having taken the difficult but necessary step of revoking Ukraine’s veto over Washington’s war aims. It would be better for her if he is the one who stops insisting on goals that cannot be met. Biden would take the heat, giving Harris space to carry out what would be a controversial but necessary strategy change.
Biden would also be wise to embrace a diplomatic settlement following a Donald Trump victory. Trump, after all, is on record advocating for one himself. But by outlining a new strategy for Ukraine, one predicated on advancing a reasonable diplomatic proposal coupled with the promise of long-term military support, Biden could help set the bar for U.S. policy in a manner that would help protect Kyiv’s core interests from an individual less inclined to back Ukraine against Russia. And hopefully, Trump would ultimately see that continuing to support Ukraine while pushing for diplomacy is actually necessary to ending the conflict. The alternative—selling out Ukraine—would be rejected by Kyiv, resulting in a one-sided but open-ended war between it and Russia. A rejection by Trump of this approach or something like it would pin the moral and political responsibility for a Russian victory and Ukraine’s defeat on his administration and the United States.
The 47th U.S. president, of course, will ultimately enjoy considerable discretion. No policy can be entirely locked in by a predecessor. But assisting Ukraine in repelling Russian aggression has arguably been Biden’s greatest foreign policy accomplishment. In the time he has left, he should do whatever he can to protect it. And adopting a new, more sustainable strategy for Kyiv is the best way to do so—and to therefore ensure Ukraine continues to exist as a thriving, sovereign, independent nation.
_________________
С сожалением и понятными ожиданиями, Dimitriy.
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